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Abstract—This paper attempts to provide a brief research 
report in risk management and security areas pertaining to 
threats due fraud in the Malaysian Electronic land 
administration system. Analyses of potential threats are 
provided based on evidences from various past researches and 
working papers, documentations, and field visits. Based on the 
findings, the researchers classified and described fraud 
existence, and suggested means of which such threats can be 
reduced through appropriate use of technology, policies, and 
strategies.  
Keywords - fraud; land administration system; electronic 
land administration system; risk management; Malaysian Public 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Land is a source of wealth and has continued to be a cause 
of social, ethnic, cultural and religious conflict from time 
immemorial. Thus, as society evolved, an effective land 
administration system is needed in order to meet the 
changing needs of the world societies. A good land 
registration system is pertinent to ensure protection of 
property rights. As society progressed and become more 
complex, so are the technology and innovations, which if 
correctly designed and applied, can significantly improve 
the business process in land administration system.  
Recent years has seen the rapid improvement in 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and 
increased reliance on its use in various sectors including 
banking, constructions, medicine, government services, etc. 
Such ICT use can also be observed in the field of 
conveyancing where many countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, etc. are adopting to electronic land 
administration system or electronic 
conveyancing/registration system to effectively and 
efficiently manage land titling. The use of the technology is 
said to increase the speed of processing of various land 
dealings, improve the incidents of paper-based fraud, and 
therefore improve the overall economics in land market. A 
country like Malaysia has made efforts accordingly, to 
continuously reform its land administration system through 
its provision of law in the National Land Code and in the 
application ICT to achieve its objective of improving land 
market and sustainability.  
Land-title registration is a critical starting point in land 
management. Registration of title to land identifies 
ownership of the parcel or plot of land, as well as other 
forms of tenure and interests on it, simplifies, cheapens and 
expedites land transactions and conveyancing and improves 
credit flow to land development, as well as facilitates more 
effective planning for orderly human settlement [5]. It is 
therefore, highly crucial that the system is designed to 
minimize incidents of fraud that can impose threat to the 
credibility of the government in ensuring the indefeasibility 
of title to land owners.  
Accordingly, this article seeks to identify and discuss the 
risk of fraud in existing land administration system in 
Malaysia and recommend ways for which fraud can be 
overcome with through the use of electronic land 
administration system. The paper provides the analysis on 
the types of fraud that can be made possible through the 
existing partially manual and computerised system, and 
suggest ways for overcoming the fraud through the design of 
a good electronic land administration system in Malaysia. As 
part of the recommendation, suggestions for the potential 
reform to the government security strategies are also 
provided. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Malaysian land administration system is based on the 
Torrens system. The Torrens Title System was first 
introduced in South Australia in 1858 and subsequently 
used in other Australian states and some parts around the 
world [19]. The main objective of the Torrens title system is 
to make the Register of documents of title conclusive 
evidence of land ownership. Once a person’s title or interest 
is registered in accordance with the prescribed registration 
procedures, it will be recorded in the Register document of 
title, and the person in whose favour the dealing is 
registered will become the indefeasible proprietor or interest 
holder to the exclusion of all others.  
A. Definition of Fraud 
 
Low (2008) [13] defined fraud as activities involving 
some form of deceit, where there is an act of deliberate 
dishonesty or an intention to deceive and that there is lost 
suffered due to that deceit. In his description of fraud, Low 
identified fraud into the following:  
• Forgery of signatures; fraudulent execution of the 
victim’s signature on an instrument of mortgage; 
• Fraudulent execution of a power of attorney and 
subsequent mortgaging of the family home using the 
power of attorney; 
• Fraudulent person either fraudulent executing or 
coercing execution of a transfer of the subject property 
to the fraudulent person’s wife/son/husband; 
• Misleading the registered proprietor into signing 
mortgage documents over the subject property; 
impersonating the registered proprietor and fraudulently 
arranging for a mortgage to be registered over the 
subject land. 
Besides Low (2008) [13], Maidin and Khadouf (2009) [14], 
Ismail (2008) [8] also discusses the concept of fraud from 
the legal and administration perspective in the context of 
Malaysian land administration system. 
 
B. The Signifcance of Understanding and Minimising 
Fraud 
 
Why is it important to minimise fraud in land 
administration? Low (2008) [13] acknowledged that the 
importance of providing the owners of land with secure title 
is vital for economic well-being and growth. The foundation 
of the Torren system of registration has been secure or 
indefeasible title, which is central in the system of 
registration. However, incident of fraud may have the effect 
of eroding the owners’ security of title.  The argument has 
been that this will lead to the loss of owner confidence in 
the Torren system’s ability to provide security of title, 
which may result in the lack of confidence to associate 
themselves in behaviour related to ownership such as sales, 
rental, use as collateral, and upgrading investments 
[(Lanjouwv and Levy, 2004) [10].  
Increasing cases of fraud in Malaysia and public 
awareness and pressure to the severity of the incidents have 
triggered the needs of the Ministry of the Natural Resources 
and Environment (NRE) to seek resolution to the issue. 
Among the resolutions include the investment of 
information technology through the design of electronic 
land administration system currently called e-Tanah (Tanah 
in Malay means Land), the revision of various work 
processes and procedures in land offices, and most recently, 
the effort taken to investigate the potential reform to the 
National Land Code 1965 in order to strengthen the current 
and future application of the electronic land administration 
system.  
 
Many cases of fraud involving land transfer in Malaysia 
might have been left unreported or pending to court.  While 
the fraudulent individuals can be brought to justice, the 
victims remain uncompensated for the lost that should have 
been guaranteed by the state [14]. The fact that Malaysia 
does not have any compensation scheme to the loss of 
property due to fraudulent act, the threat to the economic 
well being in the property market can be worsen. The 
government needs to take effective action by improving its 
land administration system to overcome the issue of fraud. It 
must be better prepared in assuring indefeasibility and 
safety of title through good design and implementation of 
the ICT application systems, the use of good risk 
management strategies, security policies, and procedures in 
the electronic environment. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In this report, the authors seek to identify all potential fraud 
in the current land administration system in Malaysia 
through analysis of reports, literature, cases and field visits. 
Several field visits were conducted to several locations of 
both State and District Land Offices. Information from the 
field visits was gathered through focus groups and 
interviews.  
 Based on the identified cases of fraud, analyses are 
provided to describe and explain the nature of fraud and 
how it can be prevented or overcome with using a good 
design of electronic land administration system. In addition 
to the suggested strategies and design, the authors also seek 
to propose appropriate strategies that are needed for 
effective management and administration of electronic land 
administration system in the country.  
IV. FINDINGS  
A. Types fraud identified  
Analysis of cases and police records has led to statistical 
reports to illustrate the cases of fraud in various states in 
Malaysia. A total of 313 cases of land related fraud was 
reported between 2005 until 2008 (Commercial Crime 
Department, Royal Malaysian Police Force). The highest 
cases were spotted in the areas of which the land value is 
found very high. The type of cases involving fraud were 
related to the use of forms (Form 14A) in dealing with land 
registration for the purpose of changing ownership (102 
cases reported), the use of false title, identity and Sales and 
Purchase Agreement (50 cases), and the use of false Power 
of Attorney and Court Order (33 cases). Such fraudulent 
activities took place when the administration system is 
handled by both manual and computerised registration 
system. Arguably, such fraudulent activities were anticipated 
to be solved or reduced through a good design of electronic 
land administration system.  
In brief, the flow of land title registration process 
begin with the use of forms (Form 14A) and the preparation 
of related documents such as the original land titles, copies, 
legal documents, proof of identifications, payment receipts, 
etc. Once completed, the forms and the compiled documents 
are presented at the service counter, which is later verified. 
Once approved, the registration of title into a new owner 
name or charger (i.e. banker) can then take place 
accordingly. Once registered, the title is considered 
indefeasible, which grant a secured and absolute ownership 
to a person whose name being registered.  
Ismail (2008) [8] illustrated the potential pattern of 
fraud through Figure 1 below.  Accordingly, the pattern of 
fraud in land administration can be identified at each step in 
the process, along with the legal sanction provided through 
the NLC 1965, which can still be penetrated.  
Based on the illustration in the figure, fraud can 
take the form of forgery of signature, fraud by misleading 
the victim into signing, fraud by solicitors, identity fraud, 
and fraud by getting access to the system through system 
password. All of these frauds can take place at different 
level in the process.  
 
 
Figure 1 
REGISTRATION TO CONFER INDEFEASIBLE TITLE 
OR INTEREST
INSTRUMENT
PRESENTATION
VERIFICATION
REGISTRATION
INDEFEASIBLE TITLE
DEFEASIBLE TITLE
National Land Code 1965
Section 292:
Preparation of  instruments for 
registrable dealings (i.e. Transfer, 
charge, lease, etc).
Documentations are in order
Fees paid.
Section 292 to section 301A:
Section 303:
Power of  Registrar – documents 
are fit for registration
Section 88, 89 & 304:
Manner of  registration
Authenticated under hand signature 
and seal of  the Registrar 
Section 340(1): “free from fraud / 
forgery elements”
Section 340(2): “in consequence of  
fraud / forgery elements”
Fraud & Forgery 
Variables:
Forgery of  
signature
Fraud by 
misleading the 
victim into 
signing relevant 
documentation
Fraud by 
solicitors
Identity fraud
Fraud by gaining 
access to the 
digital signature 
certificate and 
associated 
password. 
Compensation 
for Loss = 
Assurance 
Fund
 The detail illustration of fraud in the form of 
identity fraud is also provided further by Shukri (2011) [9]. 
The author illustrates the nature of fraud and the manner of 
which it can be perpetrated within both manual and 
electronic environment, giving special emphasis on the case 
of e-Tanah. E-Tanah is a system currently adopted by the 
Malaysian Government in an effort to transform current 
land administration system into fully integrated electronic 
environment.  
On the other hand, based on the analysis from pass 
research and various documentations described above, the 
researchers further gathered evidences in an attempt to 
identify all potential frauds in land administration including 
those related to electronic administration system. These types 
of fraud are identified and further categorized into: 
1. Fraud by forgery which comprise of 
o Forging of Transfer Form (i.e. form 14A) or 
Charge Form (i.e. Form 16A/B) 
? Forging of Signature 
o Registering Dealings Using Power of Attorney 
? Fraud by the solicitors at different 
authority level 
o Using Court Order to Register Dealings in Favour 
of Prospective Title or Interest Holders Without 
Verification of Validity 
? Validity of Court Order 
o Forging of signature or the power of attorney 
2. Fraud by Misrepresentation 
o Presentation and Collection of Conveyancing 
Instruments by Unauthorised Persons 
o Fraud by False identity or imposter 
3. Fraud by Alteration 
o Fraud by Land office administrator 
o Fraud By System Administrator 
4. Fraud by Hackers who Compromise Network and 
System  
5. Fraud by Credit Card Payment  
 
Further investigations have been conducted to understand the 
nature of perpetration of each fraud and how the technology 
can be used to overcome the risk.  In general, the 
perpetration of fraud can take various different forms and by 
various different individuals. Fraudulent activities can occur 
within both manual and electronic environments. The 
existing system does not provide sufficient mechanism to 
protect against these frauds or if there is any, such 
mechanism is still penetrable based on the statistical data 
provided by the Police Department.  
 There is no assurance as to the best risk 
management strategies and mechanisms applied. However, 
improvement can still be made by the Director General 
Office of Land and Mines (JKPTG) to improve the security 
of the land administration system databases and its 
processes. Therefore, much thought should be given in 
understanding how the risk can be reduced in the new 
electronic environment. Among the proposed strategies, 
processes and technical solution to the new electronic 
environment are comprised of the following:  
 
Fraud by forgery 
• Use of accurate and reliable authentication technique 
• Shared responsibility and accountability by lawyers 
• Additional client biometric authentication for consent  
• Automatic notification to owners 
Fraud by misrepresentation 
• Shared responsibility and accountability by lawyers 
• Additional client biometric authentication for consent 
• Automatic notification to owners 
• Use of Different authority level 
• Use of strict authentication strategy 
• Electronic Submission of instruments 
Fraudulent alteration 
• Use of different levels and layers of authority  
• Incorporate all modules in land administrations that are 
integrated with fewer flaws in the processes and the 
procedures incorporated. 
Fraudulent alteration by system administrator 
• Application of security strategies on the following: 
Access Control 
o Use of dual factor authentication, for example a 
combination of what you know and what you have, to 
reduce the risk of stolen identity or forged identity 
o Limit administrative rights to database system requiring 
elevated rights to make changes to the database. 
o Restrict contractors from having full system access.  
o Monitoring of audit logs including logging transaction 
details such as account used for access, activities 
conducted on the system and the time the transaction 
occurred.  These audit records need to be identified, 
stored, protected, retrieved, retained for a specific period 
of time and disposition of records shall be documented 
and implemented.  
Fraudulent alteration by land administrator 
• Access to the Land Office facility need to be protected with 
sufficient access control. 
• Contractors’ personnel requiring access to facility require 
validation. 
• Use of Operational Security Controls for 
o Monitoring of audit logs including logging transaction 
details such as account used for access, what activities 
were conducted on the system and the time the 
transaction occurred.  
o Audit records are recorded at separate log server on the 
network, to avoid unauthorized access and tampering. 
o These records are to be made available to auditors during 
audit exercise. 
Fraud by hackers 
• Use of data Encryption in transit and in storage to avoid 
malicious program and prevent eavesdropping.  
• Access to the Land Office facility need to be protected with 
sufficient access control. 
• Contractors’ personnel requiring access to facility require 
validation. 
Fraud by credit card 
• Implement secure protocol for credit card use such as 3-D 
Secure by Visa and  SecureCode by MasterCard.   
• The use of the secure protocol 
V. MITIGATING FRAUD 
 
In order to mitigate fraud in land administration, 
several measures can be applied.   In this regards, security 
policy assumes the most import role in fraud mitigation 
measures. Information security policy is an overarching 
policy that sets the rules and requirements for security 
governance within the organisation.  The policy shall be 
supported by specific security policies and procedures 
covering not only preventive measures but also responsive 
measures towards fraud related incidents. 
Information security policy also binds security 
objectives with business objectives. The most basic security 
objectives in any information system include preservation of 
information confidentiality; provision of information 
integrity, ensuring availability of information at any time it 
is needed; and ensuring accountability to any faulty 
consequences. Lofstedt (2005) [11] also proclaims that the 
e-government security efforts must satisfy these basic 
security requirements in information system.  
The next important phase in the process is the need 
for proper classification of information gathered through 
system administration and work processes. Such 
classification must be made in accordance to its value and 
the risk of various threats and vulnerabilities. Once 
classified, risk assessment strategies and activities are 
conducted in order to identify the gaps and risk treatment 
measures. According to Tang et al (2007) [19] among the 
highest system risks in e-government is malicious attack. 
Therefore, in addition to fraud, which is highly risky in the 
land administrative industry, attention must also be paid in 
reducing risk that is highly vulnerable in the electronic 
environment. Such attack can cause corruptions to the 
databases and in system applications. In this case, measures 
are needed to protect the key information gathered by all 
Land Offices pertaining to user details used for access 
control as well as the land title registration databases.    
One important measure in protecting electronic 
data is by protecting the network of which the system 
operates. Benabdallah (2002) [3] has noted that to secure the 
internal network for managing and updating e-services, the 
government needs to provide adequate tools for 
authentication and identification of users. Digital signature 
and PKI appear to be good solutions. Digital certifications 
are mechanisms that can be applied to authenticate identity 
of users, identity of computer hosts or browsers, or a hybrid 
profile. According to Stalling (2003) [17], a digital signature 
is used to authenticate the message that comes from a 
particular sender. This is normally done by attaching a code 
that acts as a signature of the sender. This signature 
guarantees the source and the integrity of the message. With 
the implementation of a paperless or fully electronic land 
administration environment, digital certificates can be used 
for authorizing various administrative and user levels who 
seek to interact with the system.  However, it is imperative 
that the digital certificates used are issued by Certification 
Authority in Malaysia such as Digicert and Trustgate, in 
order to enforce digital contracts and authorization, in 
alignment with the Digital Signature Act 1997 (Malaysian 
Communication and Multimedia Commission).     
Encryption is another underlying technology to be 
used in land administration to ensure confidentiality and   
integrity of information.  Information stored and transmitted 
over the network, wired or wireless, need to be encrypted to 
prevent unauthorized access and eventual fraudulent use of 
the information. The strength of encryption is determined by 
several factors, in which two of the main factors are the 
types of algorithm or cipher used, and the key length used 
during the encryption process.  
In addition to the above recommendation, security 
controls also need to be implemented to provide a synergy 
between the policy and the technological solutions 
suggested.  Security needs to begin with policy, before 
technology can be selected and implemented.  However, 
prior to policy development and technology investment, risk 
assessment is the first step in valuation and prioritization of 
information asset.   
  
VI. PROPOSED POLICY DIRECTION  
The research has resulted in the suggested policy direction 
for the government in insuring more effective risk and 
security management activities. The following thirteen 
recommendations are provided for the JKPTG to address the 
issues found concerning security strategies in the Malaysian 
land administration context:  
1) To develop and provide a mechanism that protects the 
system from fraud, preserves confidentiality, 
accountability and integrity, and at the same time 
makes information available for business continuity 
through security policy and strategies 
2) To develop effective information security policy and 
strategies by taking into consideration the following 
factors: 
a. Formal governance 
b. Information classification  
c. Access control 
d. Communication and operations 
e. Physical security 
f. Personnel security 
g. Information system acquisition, development 
and maintenance 
h. Information security incident management 
i. Business continuity management 
3) To establish a working committee that governs and 
establishes strategies, policies and procedures for the 
protection of the Critical Infrastructures and land 
information 
4) To formalize information security governance led by 
top management 
5) To conduct periodic security audit and risk assessment 
of existing as well as newly developed system such as 
eLAS or e-Tanah, for threats, vulnerabilities and impact 
associated to the risk on the asset. 
6) To identify the factors that may results in eLAS risk 
and vulnerability such as types of fraud, malicious 
attacks etc.  and formulate specific policies, strategies 
and technical resolutions in minimizing them 
7) To provide adequate tools for assessment and 
evaluation of risks and potential threats to the networks 
and databases 
8) To provide adequate tools for authentication and 
identification of users through Digital signature, digital 
authentication and PKI  
9) To use encryption technology when storing and 
transmitting information over the network to prevent 
unauthorized access and ensure confidentiality and  
integrity of information 
10) To use effective IT solutions in safeguarding against 
technical penetration to the network and databases such 
as biometric identification devices, a good encryption 
techniques in managing user id and password, and a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)  
11) To implement trust management policy and strategy on 
IT personnel who have direct access to databases. For 
instance, to certify or gazette IT personnel who can gain 
access to the databases through the backdoor channel 
similar to the role of a registrar 
12) To provide guidelines and requirement specifications on 
information security made available for any online 
system in order to qualify the system as a secure system 
under security certification and for the system to be 
gazetted as secured and safe to use 
13) To provide training and awareness programme on the 
importance of security management 
VII. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSION  
 
The existence of fraud may impose serious implication to 
the indefeasible title conceptualize by the Torrens System in 
land registration. The economic value and development of 
land highly depend on the security of title, which ensures 
the right to ownership upon transfer. Hence, this will ensure 
the security in the land market where various transactions 
can occur such as sales, purchases, loans, mortgages, etc, 
with full confidences from buyers and owners.  
Fraud in land administration can take up many 
different forms. Fraud can occur in any land administration 
platform, which can be based on only manual or paper-
based land administration system, or a combination of 
manual and paper-based land administration system, or a 
fully electronic land administration system.  Overview of 
fraud indicates several different patterns, which can be 
categorized into types of frauds – fraud by forgery, fraud by 
false power of attorney, fraud by misleading victim into 
signing, fraud by false identity, and fraud by false alteration. 
Fraud can be further categorized into by whom it is 
committed - lawyers and solicitors, clerks and runners, 
family members, corporate representatives, administrators 
(i.e. land administrators, system administrators). Fraud can 
be done through forging of signature (the witness’s or 
witness attest), misleading or inducing victim into signing 
the authorization form, altering the content of title 
document, and pretending to be the person with the right to 
deal. Mortgage and transfer have been identified to be the 
most common transactions involving fraud. 
Certain common theme in fraud or the so called 
enabling factor can be fraudulent individuals and 
relationship with the victims, fraudulent individuals and 
access to certificate of title and other identity documents, 
verification and identification procedures not followed 
(prosecute transfer without confirming with the victim), 
non-compliance with witnessing requirements, weak system 
involving the processes and procedures, and design of the 
technology with poor security procedures.   
The use of the technology may minimise fraud that 
are common in the paper-based and partially computerised 
land administration system. Such technology must be 
properly designed with tight security procedures using 
various levels of authentication and verification techniques. 
Malaysia has the advantage of overcoming the issue of 
validation using the biometric thump print device. The 
application of such validation technique can give Malaysia 
an added advantage of developing and implementing the 
most secure system in land administration compared to 
many others worldwide.  
On the other hand, the use of poor technology and 
poor strategies in handling or managing security issues may 
increase the risk of fraud with the electronic environment. In 
this regard, it is important to become aware of how fraud 
can happen even within the electronic environment. Future 
analysis should lead us to the detail of how fraud can take 
place with the use of technology. At this juncture, it is 
sufficient for us in giving the analysis of fraud and how it 
can be overcome with through a good design of the 
technology, and suggestion for legal or judiciary reform to 
enable the changes to take place. .  
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